How the Prussian catastrophe against Napoleon basically “created” the modern Combined Arms Doctrine
The reorganization of Prussian military doctrine to fit modern, rapid tactics after the defeat at the war of the Fourth coalition created the modern combined arms doctrine as we know it today.
In 1806, the Prussians suffered a catastrophic defeat against Napoleon’s Grande Armée at the battles of Jean-Auerstedt that started a series of Prussian military reforms which would eventually lead to the founding of the early modern warfare doctrine.
Before this point, Prussian military doctrine was encapsulated by one image: the Prussian Goose Step. Using the Goose Step, disciplined lines of Prussian soldiers marched onward, showcasing a dominant, rigid, unified fighting force that would strike fear in the hearts of even the most stoic men. The doctrine was deeply conservative, and involved maximizing the musket volley rate. There was to be no changes to the doctrine because of its conservative nature, and this led to the defeat by Napoleon’s fast-moving lines. The Grande Armée absolutely decimated the slow, rigid Prussian lines with its flexible columns and speedy skirmishers. Following the treaties of Tilsit in 1807, Prussia lost half of its territories to the continental system. Something had to change.

The Prussian military reform committee was created in 1807 after the defeat had been finalized. The committee looked to replace the old, deeply conservative doctrine with something new, something that was inspired by the faster army of Napoleon. However, Napoleon’s doctrine was heavily influenced by his own genius. Prussia wanted to find a way where anybody could use this system and succeed. And so, the reforms began. Out went the rigid lines and in came combined arms warfare- fast moving columns, hybrid skirmishers just like Napoleon’s army, and a decentralized military designed for anybody to use, no matter the strategic capability of themselves. Their system, called Auftragstaktik, utilized training subordinate officers to also understand the military plans, so that the army wasn’t reliant on one man like the French were.

After the fall of Napoleon, Prussia sought to use their new military prowess for German unification. Under the leadership of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, decentralization of the military command structure was pushed even further. Helmuth von Moltke recognized that “no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force” (Ueber Strategie - Helmuth von Moltke the Elder). Thus, he gave subordinate officers even more freedom to do the plans that they wanted to do. This decentralization was needed due to the new Prussian professional army doctrine that enabled the Prussians, after the defeat, to recruit more people. This system was called the Krumper system, and it paralleled Napoleon’s Levee en Masse doctrine. If the command was centralized, there would simply be too many people to order around and adjustments would not be flexible. Using decentralized command, Helmuth was able to unify Germany. He also pioneered new technologies in the military, such as communication using telegrams and railways that facilitated his other new military strategies- the most significant one being “battle of annihilation” the tactic utilizing rapid warfare similar to the infamous blitzkrieg technique used later by the Third Reich. Forms of the famed Prussian discipline were still preserved however, with the new staff officers being extensively trained in history, science, geography, and warfare to coordinate movements with precision.
The Prussian doctrine heavily influenced later German Blitzkrieg tactics and modern NATO combined arms warfare doctrines as well. The decentralization of command is something that has been adopted by modern armies today, just like the Prussians of history, mostly due to the same reasons; that the army is too big due to modern conscription doctrines like the Krumper system or the Levee en Masse doctrine. Finally, the employment of “battle of annihilation” translates into Blitzkrieg tactics and modern mobile warfare tactics as well. Overall, Prussian innovation massively influenced modern warfare today, with decentralization, mobile warfare doctrines, and new ideas of conscription.
References:
Loch, Thorsten, and Agilolf Kesselring. “Through Artillery From Thrust to Fire: How Prussian Military Thinking Anticipated Emergent Warfare In 1870.” War in History 31, no. 2 (2023): 128–47. https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445231193878.
Lucy, Blake. Reorganization of the German Military From 1807-1945. 2023. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5481&context=doctoral.
Petersen, Claus Jørgen. “The Kingdom of Prussia 1815 (Black Powder Albion).” Scribd, 2026. https://www.scribd.com/document/712547496/The-Kingdom-of-Prussia-1815-Black-powder-Albion.
War History. “Prussian Reforms 1806-15 - WarHistory.Org.” December 20, 2016. https://warhistory.org/article/prussian-reforms-1806-15.
Wikipedia Contributors. “Helmuth Von Moltke the Elder.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, December 16, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helmuth_von_Moltke_the_Elder.
Wikipedia Contributors. “War of the Fourth Coalition.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, November 16, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fourth_Coalition.





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